India is taking a huge gamble by asking online messaging apps to bind users to SIM cards. The other DoT directive to preload a GoI cybersecurity app in handsets is also a matter of concern, even as other countries - well, like Russia - have issued similar directives. The argument for both is security. But it could very easily snowball into Big Brotherly issues, despite the telecom minister clarifying that the Sanchar Saathi app can be deleted by the phone's owner. The move could alienate global tech majors as well, for inconveniencing user-consumers by being persistently tied to SIMs and having a perceived pesky app running in the background.

India is a huge market for mobile devices and OTT messaging apps, but not big enough to alter their architecture. It risks isolating its users from the global pool, which would dilute the USP of apps like WhatsApp, and the security promised in an iPhone that provides seamless connectivity worldwide. The gains in traceability could cause unacceptable levels of reduction in privacy. India, remember, is still two years away from a full rollout of its data protection regime.

The case for regulating device-based services as intensely as SIM-based services is made out of a value proposition. But the two services are distinct. OTT communication is far more popular than SMS for a reason. There are other ways to address the traceability-privacy trade-off. ID verification at the point of creating an account on a messaging app provides additional security without impinging on user freedom. This approach can be made more or less intense, according to the inherent risks of specific forms of communication, say, those involving financial transactions. Develop analytics tools to track suspicious activity on messaging apps. These are becoming more sophisticated and avoid subjecting the entire subscriber base to technical fetters. Finally, SIM-binding can be applied selectively to categories of communicators, thereby limiting user friction. DoT may have to adjust its dos and don'ts.