The case relates to an alleged hate speech during the 2020 anti-CAA protests in Delhi, in which the Court had earlier ruled that no cognisable offence was made out. The plea filed by CPI(M) leaders Brinda Karat and K M Tiwari, seeking review of the April 29 decision of the court, has now been dismissed. "We have gone through the review petition as well as the grounds in support thereof. We do not find any error, much less apparent, in the order impugned, warranting its reconsideration," the bench said, while dismissing the review petition. The order was passed on July 29 but uploaded recently. On April 29, the top court said that no cognisable offence was made out against Thakur and Verma. While BJP MP Thakur is a former union minister, Verma is a minister in the Delhi government. The CPI(M) leaders had challenged a June 2022 verdict of the Delhi High Court in the case The high court had dismissed a petition by Karat and Tiwari challenging the trial court's refusal to direct registration of an FIR against Thakur and Verma for their alleged hate speeches over the anti-CAA protest at Delhi's Shaheen Bagh. In its judgement, the apex court noted that the high court had, on an independent assessment, held that the speeches do not disclose commission of any cognisable offence, and also observed that the statements were not directed against any specific community nor did they incite violence or public disorder. "Upon a careful consideration of the material placed on record, including the alleged speeches, the status report dated February 26, 2020 submitted before the trial court, and the reasons recorded by the courts below, we are in agreement with the conclusion that no cognisable offence is made out," the top court said. The CPI(M) leaders had claimed that on January 27, 2020, Thakur allegedly made a hate speech at a rally in Rithala. They had further claimed that on January 28, 2020, Verma allegedly made inflammatory hate speeches. A trial court on August 26, 2020, dismissed the petitioners' complaint on the grounds that it was not sustainable as the requisite sanction from the competent authority was not obtained. In its verdict, the apex court had observed the high court had declined to direct registration of an FIR on the grounds that prior sanction under Sections 196 and 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) was not obtained. It had said the scheme of erstwhile CrPC does not contemplate any embargo on the direction for registration of an FIR or the conduct of investigation at the pre-cognisance stage. "To hold otherwise would amount to introducing a restriction not envisaged by the legislature," the top court had said, adding, "The requirement of sanction is, therefore, a condition precedent only for taking cognisance and not for the registration of an FIR or for the conduct of investigation". It had said any interpretation that makes the registration of an FIR contingent upon prior sanction would invert this statutory scheme and render the provisions relating to investigation unworkable. It had noted that relief sought before the trial court in the case was confined to a direction to the police to register an FIR on the basis of the complaint submitted by the appellants. The top court had said the criminal process is designed to protect both the rights of the accused and the interests of society. "Accordingly, while we disapprove the reasoning adopted by the high court on the issue of prior sanction, we find no ground to interfere with the ultimate conclusion," it had said. In its 125-page verdict on the batch of pleas, the top court had said hate speech was "fundamentally antithetical" to the constitutional value of fraternity and strikes at the moral fabric of our republic, but no "legislative vacuum" exists warranting intervention as the existing framework adequately addresses the issue. Terming as "misconceived" the contention that the field of hate speech remains legislatively unoccupied, the top court said the constitutional scheme, founded upon the doctrine of separation of powers, does not permit the judiciary to create new offences or expand the contours of criminal liability through judicial directions.