Ukraine, in the aftermath of the Cold War, emerged as the third-largest nuclear power, inheriting a substantial stockpile of Soviet nuclear weapons. This included approximately 5,000 nuclear arms, along with long-range missiles capable of carrying up to 10 thermonuclear warheads. These weapons were stored in secret underground locations throughout the country.
Yet, despite controlling this formidable arsenal, Ukraine made the historic decision to give it up—becoming the only country ever to voluntarily relinquish its nuclear weapons. This decision would shape the course of the nation’s future and set the stage for the ongoing conflict with Russia, according to a report by the New York Times.
Russia retained the codes and the central command and control system necessary to launch them, leaving Ukraine without the capacity to use its nuclear stockpile independently. As experts note, the deterrent value of these nuclear weapons was questionable. Ukraine could not realistically rely on them for its defense due to the lack of control.
There were also significant geopolitical and economic considerations that pushed Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons. First, maintaining and securing such a large arsenal would have placed an immense strain on Ukraine’s already struggling economy.
Further, seeking operational control of the weapons could have led to severe diplomatic consequences. Allies, including the United States and NATO, might have withdrawn recognition, and Russia would likely have retaliated. The costs of sustaining the arsenal outweighed the perceived benefits.
International pressure to decommission the nuclear stockpiles in the former Soviet republics, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, led to the establishment of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in 1991.
Under this initiative, the U.S. provided funding and expertise to assist these countries in dismantling nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. It was during this time that Ukraine entered into the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in which it agreed to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
The Budapest Memorandum promised that these signatories would respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and would refrain from using force or threats against it.
Should aggression occur, the signatories vowed to seek immediate action through the United Nations Security Council to help Ukraine. Between 1994 and 1996, Ukraine completed the process of denuclearization, with the last of its nuclear arms being transported to Russia by May 1996.
As early as 1993, scholars like John J. Mearsheimer had warned that a nuclear deterrent was essential for Ukraine to maintain peace and prevent Russian attempts to reclaim its territory.
Mearsheimer argued that Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal would serve as a crucial deterrent against Russian encroachment. In light of current events, this prediction seems to have been prophetic.
In 2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for separatist movements in eastern Ukraine highlighted the fragility of the security guarantees Ukraine had received.
Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and a negotiator of the Budapest Memorandum, pointed out that a "collective failure" between Washington and Kyiv to consider the rise of Putin and Russia's future intentions contributed to the collapse of the agreement's effectiveness. Putin dismissed the Budapest accord as "null and void" and, within weeks, Russian forces occupied Crimea.
This breach of international law has not only destabilized Ukraine but has also shattered the faith many had in the reliability of security guarantees from nuclear powers.
The world watched as Russia's actions demonstrated that promises made under the Budapest Memorandum were no longer worth the paper they were written on. With Russia’s invasion of Crimea, followed by the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine, the consequences of denuclearization became painfully clear.
Ukraine has relied on Western support—particularly from the United States and NATO allies—to defend itself against Russia's invasion. This support has come in the form of military aid, including advanced weapons systems, training, and intelligence-sharing.
The war has led to immense human suffering, with the incessant killing of civilians, displacement of Ukrainians, and widespread destruction across the country.
As the war rages on, the question of Ukraine's security remains a central issue.
Experts have raised concerns about the viability of the Budapest Memorandum's promises and whether future guarantees can prevent another wave of Russian aggression. While the West continues to support Ukraine in its struggle, questions about NATO membership and the long-term security framework for Ukraine remain unresolved.
(With inputs from NYT)
Yet, despite controlling this formidable arsenal, Ukraine made the historic decision to give it up—becoming the only country ever to voluntarily relinquish its nuclear weapons. This decision would shape the course of the nation’s future and set the stage for the ongoing conflict with Russia, according to a report by the New York Times.
The decision to de-nuclearise
In the early 1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine faced numerous complex challenges. Though it had physical possession of a large nuclear arsenal, Ukraine had no operational control over these weapons.Russia retained the codes and the central command and control system necessary to launch them, leaving Ukraine without the capacity to use its nuclear stockpile independently. As experts note, the deterrent value of these nuclear weapons was questionable. Ukraine could not realistically rely on them for its defense due to the lack of control.
There were also significant geopolitical and economic considerations that pushed Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons. First, maintaining and securing such a large arsenal would have placed an immense strain on Ukraine’s already struggling economy.
Further, seeking operational control of the weapons could have led to severe diplomatic consequences. Allies, including the United States and NATO, might have withdrawn recognition, and Russia would likely have retaliated. The costs of sustaining the arsenal outweighed the perceived benefits.
International pressure to decommission the nuclear stockpiles in the former Soviet republics, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, led to the establishment of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in 1991.
Under this initiative, the U.S. provided funding and expertise to assist these countries in dismantling nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. It was during this time that Ukraine entered into the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in which it agreed to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
The Budapest Memorandum promised that these signatories would respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and would refrain from using force or threats against it.
Should aggression occur, the signatories vowed to seek immediate action through the United Nations Security Council to help Ukraine. Between 1994 and 1996, Ukraine completed the process of denuclearization, with the last of its nuclear arms being transported to Russia by May 1996.
Putin's rise, Crimea's annexation & the unravelling of Budapest Memorandum
The peaceful vision encapsulated in the Budapest Memorandum unraveled over the past decade, particularly with the rise of Vladimir Putin and Russia's actions.As early as 1993, scholars like John J. Mearsheimer had warned that a nuclear deterrent was essential for Ukraine to maintain peace and prevent Russian attempts to reclaim its territory.
Mearsheimer argued that Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal would serve as a crucial deterrent against Russian encroachment. In light of current events, this prediction seems to have been prophetic.
In 2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for separatist movements in eastern Ukraine highlighted the fragility of the security guarantees Ukraine had received.
Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and a negotiator of the Budapest Memorandum, pointed out that a "collective failure" between Washington and Kyiv to consider the rise of Putin and Russia's future intentions contributed to the collapse of the agreement's effectiveness. Putin dismissed the Budapest accord as "null and void" and, within weeks, Russian forces occupied Crimea.
This breach of international law has not only destabilized Ukraine but has also shattered the faith many had in the reliability of security guarantees from nuclear powers.
The world watched as Russia's actions demonstrated that promises made under the Budapest Memorandum were no longer worth the paper they were written on. With Russia’s invasion of Crimea, followed by the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine, the consequences of denuclearization became painfully clear.
A war that has lasted three years
In 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, plunging the country into a brutal crisis. Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, which had been guaranteed by international agreements, were now being directly threatened by a nuclear-armed nation.Ukraine has relied on Western support—particularly from the United States and NATO allies—to defend itself against Russia's invasion. This support has come in the form of military aid, including advanced weapons systems, training, and intelligence-sharing.
The war has led to immense human suffering, with the incessant killing of civilians, displacement of Ukrainians, and widespread destruction across the country.
As the war rages on, the question of Ukraine's security remains a central issue.
Experts have raised concerns about the viability of the Budapest Memorandum's promises and whether future guarantees can prevent another wave of Russian aggression. While the West continues to support Ukraine in its struggle, questions about NATO membership and the long-term security framework for Ukraine remain unresolved.
(With inputs from NYT)
